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Supreme Court Review
A brief factual survey of the cases follows.
The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto v. Samuel, Son & Co. Ltd.,
[1963] S.C.R. 175.
In this case dealing with the expropriation of industrial land the
Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal affirming a unani-
mous Court of Appeal decision. The court held that the correct basis
for computing compensation payable is to ascertain the market value
of the land plus the replacement cost of the building in the new loca-
tion, less depreciation of the old building. To this sum the cost of
moving the plant is to be added, as well as an allowance for the
physical dislocation of business, for disruption of business and minor
matters, lumped together under "Additional allowance, disturbance,
moving, etc."
The arbitrator had awarded 10% additional allowance for com-
pulsory taking before the decision in Drew v. The Queen, [1961]
S.C.R. 614. Hence this award had to be disallowed by the Court of
Appeal.
This was the clearest case considered and no more will be said
about it except to point out that the value to the owner was found
by taking the market value of the land plus the value which the
building had on account of its suitability for the owner's purposes.
The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority v.
Valley Improvement Company Limited, [1963] S.C.R. 15.
The land involved was the low-lying strip along the Humber
River, part of a larger tract of land owned b ; respondent and on
which it operated a restaurant, tennis courts and bowling greens. The
"value to the owner"-the test adopted by the courts since the Su-
preme Court decision in Woods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The King,
[1951] S.C.R. 504-depended on the use to which the respondent
planned to put that particular strip of land.
It also depended on the use to which the land retained by respon-
dent could legally be put. "These expropriated lands could only have
value to the owner of the amount assigned to them by the respondent
if they remained part of the whole and were rezoned," as Judson J.
said at page 34.
Compensation was proferred at a rate of $739 per acre. The
owner held out for about $24,500 per acre. He stated in argument
that were the lands rezoned to permit the construction of apartment
buildings, the value would be even higher, viz., $40,000 per acre. But
the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that this value should be
discounted by 331/3% because of the "uncertainties and delays im-
plicit in the necessity of obtaining appropriate rezoning." (p. 22)
The value to the owner thus depended largely on the speculative
element of rezoning. The Ontario Municipal Board had come to the
1964]
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conclusion that there was not a reasonable probability of the desired
rezoning being realized and had added nothing to the compensation
on the ground of possible rezoning. p. 22.
The Court of Appeal ([1961] O.R. 783, at 800, 801) wrestled
with the problem of trying to express in percentage terms the "nega-
tive value" of zoning restrictions in force at the time of expropriation
and affecting the land in question. It is submitted that this may be
taken as an indication that the principles underlying valuation are
not quite so simple and straightforward as would seem desirable.
With a view to some type of construction, probably consonant
with permitted zoning uses, the owner had some soil sampling tests
carried out and sketches and architects plans prepared, and had ob-
tained cost-estimates on the proposed motel. Because of the expro-
priation, all these plans were abandoned.
In trying to arrive at the "value to the owner" it seems pointless
to try to determine the sum of money which the owner, as a prudent
man, at the moment of expropriation would have paid for the land
rather than be deprived of it, as required by the Woods test, because
it is virtually impossible to ban from the mind the awareness of
actual facts, namely that expropriation has taken place. It is equally
unhelpful for this purpose to direct the tribunal to take into consid-
eration the probability or even the possibility of the rescission of any
by-law restricting the use to which the property may be put. These
latter considerations are certainly important factors for the deter-
mination of "market value".
However, it is submitted that the "value to the owner" must mean
what he thinks he can get for his land. This entails the use to which
he thinks he can put the land sooner or later, and his willingness to
await favourable conditions.
The case was remitted to the Ontario Municipal Board to be dealt
with in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court.
Standish Hall Hotel Incorporated v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 64.
Her Majesty in right of Canada expropriated the appellant's
property which included a hotel. After holding the title for 22 months,
the Crown abandoned most of the property which revested in the
former owner. The appellant had meanwhile, with consent of the
Crown, remained in possession of the property, and continued to
carry on its business there paying no rent.
The rule in a case of this nature seems quite simple. The value
of the land is assessed as of the date of expropriation, and as well at
the date of revesting. The latter figure is then subtracted from the
former, and, subject to certain adjustments, the difference is the
amount of compensation to which the owner is entitled (Gibb v. The
King, [1918] A.C. 915). So far so good. However, in practice the facts
do not always lend themselves to the application of this simple formula.
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